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Abstract- The use of formal methods to verify the correctness of digital circuits is
less constrained by the growing complexity of digital circuits than conventional
methods based on exhaustive simulation. This paper briefly outlines three
main approaches to formal hardware verification: symbolic simulation_state
machine analysis, and theorem-proving.
1 Introduction
Advances in VLSI fabrication technology have greatly outstripped 'verification capacity'
-- that is, the capacity of conventional methods for demonstrating that the design of a
circuit is correct with respect to a specification of its requirements.
Verification capacity has fallen behind fabrication technology because conventional ver-
ification methods do not scale with complexity. These methods are generally based on
simulation -- they do not scale because the number of simulation cases is likely to increase
exponentially if one attempts to maintain the same degree of coverage.
Considerable effort has been made to increase, in a brute-force manner, what coverage
can be achieved with simulation. One approach is to distribute the simulation cases over
a large number of machines running identical versions of the simulation model. Another
brute-force approach has been the development of special-purpose simulation hardware
to increase the speed of a simulation by several orders of magnitude. However, these
techniques do not offer a satisfactory, long-term solution for verifying digital designs by
exhaustive simulation because, in general, the number of simulation cases grows exponen-
tially with the number of components in a design.
Of course, it may be argued that it is not really necessary, for any practical purpose,
to exhaustively simulate a design in order to detect every error in a design. Instead, it
would be argued that it is only reasonable to simulate the design for a feasible number
of representative cases. However, this assumes that there is general-purpose, systematic
method for finding a truely representative set of simulation cases. Although one can easily
imagine a systematic way of generating some obvious cases, it is clear that digital systems
often fail at the "confluence of unrelated or seemingly unrelated events" [25].
Formal methods offer considerable hope for verification techniques which are better able
to scale with the complexity of VLSI designs. We can identify three distinct approaches
to formal hardware verification, namely, symbolic simulation, state machine analysis, and
theorem-proving. These formal ai_proaches to hardware verification are better able to scale
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with the complexity of VLSI designs because they exploit powerful tools of mathematics
rather than brute-force. A good example is the use of the mathematical induction which is
a mainstay of the theorem-proving approach to formal hardware verification. All of these
approaches are supported by software tools -- many of which have been under constant
development for the last decade or longer.
2 The Symbolic Simulation Approach
The concept of symbolic simulation was first proposed by researchers in the late 1970's as a
method for evaluating register transfer language representations [11]. The early programs
were very limited in their analytical power since their symbolic manipulation methods were
weak. Consequently, symbolic simulation did not evolve much further until more efficient
methods of manipulating symbols emerged. The development of Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams (OBDDs) for representing Boolean functions [8] radically transformed symbolic
simulation.
The first "post-OBDD" symbolic simulators were simple extensions of traditional logic
simulators [7]. in these symbolic simulators the input values could be arbitrary Boolean
expressions over some Boolean variables rather than only O's, l's (and possibly X's) as in
traditional logic simulators. Consequently, the results of the simulation were not single
values but rather Boolean functions describing the behavior of the circuit for the set of
- a_ possible data-represented by kthe-Bo01eanvariabies. To illustrate-tiffs idea, consider
the (pseudo) Domino CMOS circuit shown in Fig. 1. If the circuit is clocked correctly,
the inputs are stable long enough before the clock goes high, and the inputs and clock
signal are then kept stable, the output node should eventually change to 1 if and only
if the number represented by the 4-bit binary input vector a is greater than the number
represented by the 4-bit binary input vector b, and both numbers are greater than zero.
In a simple OBDD-based symbolic simulator we would simply apply the Boolean input
variables at the correct time and in the end compare the value on the output node with
the Boolean function:
(as_s + (as (9 bz)(a2_2 + (a2 (9 b2)(albl + (al (9 bx)a0b0)))(b3 + b2 + bl + b0)
A verifier based on symbolic simulation applies logic simulation to compute the circuit's
response to a series of stimuli chosen to detect all possible design errors. When a circuit has
been "verified" by simulation, this means that any further simulation would not uncover
any errors. Hence, the problem of verifying the correctness of a design becomes one of sim-
ulating a large number of input patterns. Selecting such a set of simulation patterns is a
nontrivial task, since errors that arise during the design process cannot be easily character-
ized. Designer's misconceptions, incomplete or inconsistent specifications, and carelessness
on the part of the designer can cause the resulting circuit to behave unpredictably. Worst
of all, it may misbehave only under unusual combinations of circumstances. Rather than
trying to postulate a simplified "fault model" for design errors, it is more appropriate to
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Figure 1: Circuit for computing A > B > O.
adopt a philosophy that design verification must work against a malicious adversary. That
is, given a proposed simulation test, the adversary will attempt to create a circuit that
does not fulfill the specification, yet passes the test. A circuit is considered "correct" only
if no adversary can defeat the simulation test. Thus, when a circuit has been "verified" by
simulation, this means that any further simulation would not uncover any errors.
Since a symbolic simulator is based on a traditional logic simulator, it can use the same,
quite accurate, electrical and timing models to compute the circuit behavior. For example,
a detailed switch-level model, capturing charge sharing and subtle strengths phenomena,
and a timing model, capturing bounded delay assumptions, are well within reach. Also--
and of great significance--the switch-level circuit used in the simulator can be extracted
automatically from the physical layout of the circuit. Hence, the correctness results will
link the physical layout with some higher level of specification.
Recently, Bryant and Seger [10] developed a new generation of symbolic simulator
based verifier. Here the simulator establishes the validity of formulas expressed in a very
limited, but precisely defined, temporal logic. This temporal logic allows the user to express
properties of the circuit over trajectories: bounded-length sequences of circuit states. The
verifier checks the validity of these formulas by a modified form of symbolic simulation.
Further, by exploiting the 3-valued modeling capability of the simulator, where the third
logic value X indicates an unknown or indeterminate value, the complexity of the symbolic
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manipulations is reduced considerably.
This verifier supports a verification methodology in which the desired behavior of the
circuit is specified in terms of a set of assertions, each describing how a circuit operation
modifies some component of the (finite) state or output. The temporal logic allows the user
to define such interface details as the clocking methodology and the timing of input and
output signals. The combination of timing and state transition information is expressed
by an assertion over state trajectories giving properties the circuit state and output should
obey at certain times whenever the state and inputs obey some constraints at earlier times.
This form of specification works very well for circuits that are normally viewed as
state transformation systems, i.e., where each operation is viewed as updating the circuit
state. Using a prototype system, a simple 32-bits microprocessor and a significant portion
of a modern 32 bit RISC microprocessor have been verified. These circuits contained
around 15,000 transistors and the verification effort required less than two hours on a
MIPS Magnum 3000 workstation. The complete verification process including developing
the specification, deriving the circuit description, and carrying out the symbolic ternary
simulation, took less than a person-week.
3 State Machine Analysis
A second approach to formal hardware verification is state machine analysis. This approach
uses algorithmic techniques to decide whether a finite state machine satisfies a set of user-
specified properties. In this brief overview, we focus on just one particular approach to
state machine analysis called model-checking. Other approaches to state machine analysis
include those based on language containment tests [23].
We use the example of a simple handshaking protocol, illustrated by the timing di-
agram in Figure 2, to describe the state-machine analysis approach to formal hardware
verification.
req
ack
Figure 2: Timing diagram for simple handshaking protocol.
This protocol could be implemented either in software or directly in hardware. A
'correct _ implementation oF this protocol must satisfy the following properties:
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"whenever the request signal becomes true, it must remain true
until it is acknowledged"
"every request must eventually be acknowledged"
"whenever the acknowledgement signal becomes true, it must remain true
until the request signal returns to false"
"the request signal will eventually return to false after
the request is acknowledged"
"whenever the request signal is false, it will remain false until
the acknowledgement signal is also false"
"the acknowledgement signal will eventually return to false after
the request signal returns to false"
"once false, the acknowledgement signal will remain false until
there is a request"
"whenever the acknowledgement signal is false,
there will eventually be a request"
These properties can be translated one-by-one into temporal logic. The symbols U, (>,
--- and _ can be informally read as "until", "eventually", "not" and "implies".
(req _ (req U ack))
(req _ (<_ack))
(ack _ (ack U (_req)))
(ack _ (_(_req)))
((_req) _ ((_req) U (_ack)))
((_req) ---* (_ (_ack)))
((_ack) ---* ((_ack) U req))
((_ack) _ (Oreq))
A program for automatic state machine analysis would take, as input, a machine-
readable list of formally specified properties such as the eight properties listed above. The
analyzer program would also take, as input, a machine-readable description of a finite
state machine, for example, a model of a candidate implementation of the handshaking
protocol. The analyzer program would then generate either the answer "yes", meaning
that the state machine does indeed satisfy all of the properties supplied by the user, or
the answer "no", meaning that the machine fails to satisfy at least one of these properties.
When the outcome is "no", the analyzer may also produce helpful information about how
the state machine fails to satisfy a particular property, i.e., a counter-example.
State-machine analysis is bounded by the number of states in the finite state machine.
Early state machine analysis techniques relied on the explicit enumeration of states which,
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reportedly, limits the use of these techniques to systems with between 10 s and 10 e reach-
_b!e states. Unfortunately, the number of states in a system may grow exponentially with
the number of concurrent components in the system. To deal with this "state explosion
problem", several groups [3,9,16] have investigated ways to represent a state space symbol-
ically rather than explicitly. A popular candidate for the symbolic representation of states
are OBDD's -- mentioned earlier in connection with the symbolic simulation approach.
Using this symbolic approach, it is reported that state machine analysis can be applied in
practice to systems with ]n excess of 1020 states [9].
State machine analysis techniques have been applied to several commercial designs.
These techniques were used to discover several possible execution sequences leading to
failure in a design for the cache Consistency protocol of the Encore Gigamax multiprocessor
[24]. Another approach to state machine analysis (based on language containment) has
been used by AT&T in the design of a packet layer controller chip [23].
4 Theorem Proving
A third approach to formal hardware verification, computer-assisted theorem-proving, is
based on the construction of a proof in formal logic. This proof is a formal argument that
a hardware design, based on some model of the primitive components, satisfies a formal
specification of its requirements. Figure 3 shows an example of a formal proof establishing
the correctness of the two-component design shown in Figure 4.
I. ANDCate_IMP (il,i2,outp)
2. 3x. NANDGate (il,i2,x) A NOTGate (x,outp)
3. NANDGate (il,i2,x) A NOTGate (x,outp)
4. NANDGate (il,i2,x)
5. x = _(il A i2)
6. NOTGate (x,outp)
7. outp = _x
8. outp ffi _(_(ii A i2))
9. outp = (il A i2)
I0. ANDGate (il,i2,outp)
II. ANDGate.IMP (il,i2,outp)
ANDGate (il,i2,outp)
[from above circuitdiagram]
[by def.of AIIDGate_IMP]
[strip off "3x."]
[left conjunct of llne 3]
[by def. of IAIDGato]
[right conjunct of llne 3]
[by def. of li0TGal;e]
[substitution, line 5 into 7]
[simplify,----t ffi _]
[by def. of AlI)Gate]
[discharge assumption, line 1]
Figure 3: Formal proof of correctness for an AND-Gate.
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outp
Figure 4: Implementation of an AND-gate from an NAND-gate and an inverter.
Both ordinary human reasoning and formal proof can be used to show that a specific
conclusion follows from a certain set of assumptions by accepted laws of reasoning. How-
ever, formal proof is a purely syntactic process. A proof is formally defined as a sequence
of lines (such as the numbered sequence of lines in Figure 3) where each line follows from
a previous line by rule of inference. There are only a finite number of primitive inference
rules (in fact, usually a very small number of primitive rules). The validity of any particu-
lar line in a proof can be decided by a purely syntactic test based on checking to see if any
one of the primitive inference rules can be used to justify that particular llne in the proof.
Unlike ordinary human reasoning, which is notoriously error-prone, formal proof is
extremely rigorous. Indeed, its main advantage is that it can be mechanically checked. The
main disadvantage of formal proof, compared to ordinary human reasoning, is that formal
proof is overwhelmingly tedious. The very simple proof in Figure 3 has just eleven lines,
but a formal proof of correctness for a real design (such as a simple microprocessor) may
involve several million primitive inference steps. Fortunately, there has been considerable
progress made towards the partial automation of formal proof. A very large fraction of
the actual line-by-line inference steps in a formal proof can be generated automatically by
computer-based theorem-prover.
A digital circuit can be "verified" using a theorem-prover by generating a theorem which
states that the formal specification of a design logically satisfies a formal specification of
its intended behaviour (i.e. a high level model). The exact meaning of "satisfies" is
stated unambiguously as a mathematical relationship between the two levels of formal
specification. In the very simple example shown in Figure 3, logical implication, ==_,
is used to express the relationship between the implementation of the AND-gate and its
behavioural specification:
ANDGate_IMP (il,i2,outp) _ ANDGate (il,i2,outp)
The theorem-proving approach to formal hardware verification is a structural approach
in contrast to both symbolic simulation and state-machine analysis which are behavioural
approaches. The latter two approaches, symbolic simulation and state-machine analysis,
both apply verification techniques to a 'flat' design a they do not require additional
details about the hierarchical structure of the design. On the other hand, theorem-proving
can only be applied 'in the large' to a hierarchically structured design. In a theorem-
proving approach, the design is verified hierarchically. The proof hierarchy is generally a
reflection of the hierarchical structure of the design. For example, the bottom level of this
hierarchical process may involve the formal verification of simple RTL (Register Transfer
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Level) components composed from primitives such as CMOS transistors. Each kind of
component onl_r has to be verified once in contrast to other approaches which verify
every instance of that particular component. At higher levels in the verification hierarchy,
each instance of a particular component uses the single verification result obtained from a
lower level.
The d-irect re-use of a verification-result for multiple identical instances of a partic-
ular component is a very simple form of how a single verification result can be re-used.
Theorem-proving approaches also allow generic specifications to be formally verified where
a specification is parameterized is by scalar values (e.g., the number of bits in a RTL com-
ponent) or even by data types and operations [21]. A single generic verification result can
be instantiated for different parameter values; for example, the generic specification of an
n-bit multiplier can be instantiated for different values of n, e.g., a 16-bit multiplier, a
32-bit multiplier.
The theorem-proving approach lre_es heavily upon (and benefits greatly from) a number
of mathematical tools. This includes, as with symbolic simulation, the ability to represent
data symbolically. Mathematica.l induction is also critical for scaling with the increasingly
complexity of circuit designs.
A distinct advantage of the theorem-proving approach to formal hardware verification is
the ability to verify digital systems with respect to higher algebraic levels. For example, the
correctness of arithmetic hardware can be stated directly in. terms of arithmetic operations
on natural numbers rather than Boolean operations on bit-vectors. This is often referred
to as data abstraction -- an illustrative example of this technique is given by Chin [12] in
verifying arithmetic hardware for signal processing applications. Other kinds of abstraction
include temporal abstraction which is a technique for relating computational behaviour at
increasingly abstract time scales.
Among the best known interactive theorem-provers are the Boyer-Moore Theorem
Prover [4] and the Cambridge HOL System [18,19]. The Boyer-Moore Theorem Prover
has been used by researchers at Computational Logic Inc. to develop an multi-level proof
of correctness for a complete computer system including both hardware and software levels
[1,2]. The Cambridge HOL System has been used by researchers at Cambridge Univer-
sity to verify aspects of the commercially-available Viper microprocessor designed by the
British Ministry of Defence for safety-critical applications [6,13,14,15].
5 Summary and Future Directions
This paper has briefly described three main approaches to formal hardware verification:
symbolic simulation, state-machine analysis and theorem-proving. There have already
been some trial applications of these verification techniques to real commercial designs (as
mentioned earlier) and there is evidence of increasing industrial interest in these techniques.
Many research efforts in this area are now focussed on the issue of integrating formal
verification techniques with conventional CAD. For example, researchers at Cambridge
University are investigating the use of conventional HDL's (Hardware Description Lan-
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guages) such as Ella and VHDL as specification languages for theorem-proving techniques
[5]. Another example is work that investigates links between formally verified hardware
specifications and conventional CAD tools such as silicon compilers [22].
It is unlikely that any one of the three verification approaches described in this paper
offers, by itself, a "complete" approach to verifying digital hardware. However, we believe
that a "complete" approach may be achieved by some combination of the three approaches
described here. We are currently developing a hybrid approach that based on a combi-
nation of symbolic simulation (using the COSMOS system) and theorem-proving (using
the Cambridge HOL system). The objective of our research is a hybrid formal verification
methodology (and supporting tools) which combines the complementary advantages of
theorem-proving and symbolic simulation. This methodology would allow a very abstract
specification of a digital system (specified with the full expressive power of hlgher-order
logic) to be verified with respect to a switch-level model of a CMOS digital circuit. Initial
progress on the development of a "mathematical interface" for this hybrid approach is
reported in [26].
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